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ABSTRACT
Society has a love-hate relationship with social media.
Thanks to social media platforms, the world is more
connected than ever before. But with the ever-growing
dominance of social media there have come a mass of
challenges. What is okay to post? What isn’t? And who or
what should be regulating those standards? Platforms are
now constantly criticized for their content regulation
policies, sometimes because they are viewed as too harsh
and other times because they are characterized as too lax.
And naturally, the First Amendment quickly enters the
conversation. Should social media platforms be subject to
the First Amendment? Can—or should—users be able to
assert their First Amendment rights against these platforms?
This Article dives into the legal and policy implications
surrounding the application of the First Amendment to
social media platforms. Because the state action doctrine
generally serves as a bar to enforcing constitutional
restrictions on private actors, this Article examines these
*
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First Amendment questions in light of the state action
doctrine, and more particularly its public function
exception. This Article considers whether social media
platforms fit within the public function exception and
whether such an application is tenable and proper as a
matter of law and public policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The internet has radically changed how people communicate and
receive information.1 Gone are the days when a person’s message
could only go as far as her voice could carry or to as many people
as she had postage stamps. With social media, the opportunities for
1

See Mark Lemley, Davis S. Levine & David G. Post, Don’t Break the
Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34, 37 (2011) (calling the internet “a global
platform for innovation, speech, collaboration, civic engagement, and economic
growth.”).
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connection are nearly limitless.2 In light of social media’s status and
role, this Article will examine whether social media platforms
should be treated as state actors under the public function exception
so that users may assert First Amendment rights against those
platforms.
Every advance in technology raises new challenges and
questions. For every beneficial use of social media, there are
countless harmful uses, ranging from hate speech to fake news to
online harassment.3 In response, social media platforms4 employ
content regulation policies that dictate what content is appropriate
and acceptable to be posted.5 But these policies have come under
extensive criticism due to their ambiguity or arbitrary application.6
Some say these platforms are not doing enough, and others contend
that these guidelines impinge on free speech values. 7
Although the First Amendment protects rights regarding
freedom of speech and expression, those protections do not serve as
a check on private actors due to the state action doctrine. 8 However,
2

See infra Section I.A.
See, e.g., ADL Report: Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the
2016 Presidential Campaign, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE 1 (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/presscenter/CR_4862_Journalism-Task-Force_v2.pdf [hereinafter ADL Report];
Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Tackles Rising Threat: Americans Aping Russian
Schemes
to
Deceive,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
11,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/technology/fake-news-onlinedisinformation.html.
4
For the definition of “social media platform,” see infra notes 15–21 and
accompanying text.
5
See infra Section I.B.
6
See infra Section I.B.
7
Compare Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in
the Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 127 (2014) (“[S]ocial network
websites face external and internal pressures to censor content or block particular
users’ access, a troubling situation given the importance social network websites
have assumed in contemporary social and political life.”), with Vera Eidelman,
Facebook Shouldn’t Censor Offensive Speech, ACLU (July 20, 2018),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/internet-speech/facebook-shouldntcensor-offensive-speech (“If Facebook gives itself broader censorship powers, it
will inevitably take down important speech and silence already marginalized
voices.”).
8
See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
3
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the Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to this doctrine,
holding that in some situations a private actor may be treated as a
state actor, such as when an entity serves a “public function.” 9
Courts have held that online service providers, including social
media platforms, are not state actors, giving platforms substantial
latitude in regulating content.10
This Article will consider the merits of extending the public
function exception to encompass social media platforms by
examining why such a change would be harmful as a matter of
policy and legal principle. Part I discusses the role of social media
in modern society and how platforms regulate content. Part II
examines the First Amendment and the state action doctrine. Part III
delves into commentary on the legal and social merits of bringing
platforms under the restrictions of the First Amendment. Finally,
Part IV weighs the merits of finding that such platforms fit within
the definition of state action, explaining why it is a legally unstable
approach that would grant the internet an improper pedestal in the
eyes of the law.
I. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORMS
A. Social Media Platforms in Modern Society
To say the internet is an important part of modern life is an
understatement. Social media platforms have recently become
central to everyday life. In 2018, approximately seven out of every
ten Americans used social media “to connect with one another,
engage with news content, share information and entertain
themselves.”11 Considering that one in twenty Americans used
social media in 2005,12 the adoption rate of these technologies is
staggering. Moreover, around seventy-five percent of Facebook
users and sixty percent of Instagram users visit these sites at least
9

See infra notes 68–79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 63–67, 80–93 and accompanying text.
11
Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/.
12
Id.
10
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once a day.13 Internet use is “near ubiquitous.”14
The term “social media” lacks a concrete definition.15
Dictionaries define it generally. For example, Merriam-Webster
uses the definition, “forms of electronic communication . . . through
which users create online communities to share information, ideas,
personal messages, and other content.”16 The term is used broadly
in common language. “Social media” is often used as an umbrella
term to refer to specific platforms, like Facebook, Twitter,
Instagram, Snapchat, and LinkedIn, with little consideration for
what characteristics actually make them social media platforms.17
For purposes of this Article, I will adopt Carr & Hayes’ proposed
definition of social media: “Internet-based channels that allow users
to opportunistically interact and selectively self-present, either in
real-time or asynchronously, with both broad and narrow audiences
who derive value from user-generated content and the perception of
interaction with others.”18 Social media platforms are particularly
distinguished by their interactivity component and the value they
derive from user-generated content. 19 This definition encompasses
websites like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Yelp.20 It does not
extend to websites providing services like email and online news, or
to websites like Wikipedia, Skype, or Netflix. 21
13

Id.
Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018),
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/.
15
See Caleb T. Carr & Rebecca A. Hayes, Social Media: Defining,
Developing, and Divining, 23 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 46, 46–47 (2015).
16
Social Media, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, INC., https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Nov. 12, 2018); see also
Social
Media,
CAMBRIDGE
DICTIONARY,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/social-media (last visited
Nov. 12, 2018) (defining social media as “websites and computer programs that
allow people to communicate and share information on the internet using a
computer or mobile phone.”).
17
See Carr & Hayes, supra note 15, at 46–49; Social Media Use in 2018, PEW
RES. CTR. (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/03/01/social-mediause-in-2018/.
18
Carr & Hayes, supra note 15, at 50.
19
See id. at 51–52.
20
Id. at 53.
21
Id.
14

2019]

CENSORSHIP, FREE SPEECH, & FACEBOOK

41

While social media platforms were initially started to serve a
social purpose,22 they now serve numerous roles in society.
President Trump uses Twitter to make official statements, and the
National Archives requires that his tweets be archived under the
Presidential Records Act.23 Facebook is a go-to source for news.24
Newsrooms and journalists rely on Twitter to track and disseminate
information.25 Social media sites are a vital part of the art
community, enabling artists to reach broader audiences and
providing a new creative medium.26 Social media gives the average
person with internet access the ability to reach just as many readers
as any major news source.27 In the words of Twitter’s CEO,
“[p]eople do see us as a digital public square.” 28

22

See, e.g., Kathleen Chaykowski, Mark Zuckerberg Gives Facebook a New
Mission,
FORBES
(June
22,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathleenchaykowski/2017/06/22/markzuckerberg-gives-facebook-a-new-mission/ (noting that, according to Mark
Zuckerberg, Facebook “was built to accomplish a social mission — to make the
world more open and connected.”).
23
See Lincoln Caplan, Should Facebook and Twitter be Regulated Under the
First Amendment?, WIRED (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/shouldfacebook-and-twitter-be-regulated-under-the-first-amendment/.
24
See Matt Taibbi, Taibbi: Beware the Slippery Slope of Facebook
Censorship,
ROLLING
STONE
(Aug.
2,
2018),
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/facebook-censor-alexjones-705766/ (“70 percent of Americans get their news from just two sources,
Facebook and Google.”).
25
See Peter Suderman, The Slippery Slope of Regulating Social Media, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/11/opinion/theslippery-slope-of-regulating-social-media.html.
26
See Carolina A. Miranda, Social Media Have Become a Vital Tool for
Artists — But Are They Good for Art?, L.A. TIMES (June 23, 2016),
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/miranda/la-et-cam-is-social-mediagood-for-art-20160517-snap-htmlstory.html (“[T]he advent of social media has
transformed the ways in which artists interact with each other, their public and the
institutions that govern their careers. . . . Services such as Facebook and Instagram
have come to be regarded as essential spaces . . . .”).
27
See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in
the 2016 Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211, 211 (2017).
28
Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Republicans Accuse Twitter of Bias
Against
Conservatives,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
5,
2018),

42

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:1

B. Social Media Platforms’ Content Regulation Policies
Unfortunately, but predictably, social media platforms are not
immune from objectionable content, ranging from the controversial
to the outright illegal. This content includes, but is not limited to,
hate speech,29 “fake news,”30 harassment,31 and revenge
pornography.32 In response, most platforms use “community
guidelines” to regulate posted content. For example, Instagram
states that its Community Guidelines exist to “create a safe and open
environment for everyone.”33 The guidelines prohibit content like
hate speech, nudity, and “[s]erious threats of harm.”34 In contrast,
Twitter permits “[s]ome forms of graphic violence, adult content, or
hateful imagery” as long as the tweets are marked as sensitive.35
Moreover, these content regulations have teeth. In September
2018, Twitter permanently banned Alex Jones, creator of Infowars,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/technology/lawmakers-facebook-twitterforeign-influence-hearing.html.
29
See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel et al., On Instagram, 11,696 Examples of How
Hate Thrives on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/technology/hate-on-social-media.html;
ADL Report, supra note 3.
30
See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel, Facebook Tackles Rising Threat: Americans
Aping Russian Schemes to Deceive, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/technology/fake-news-onlinedisinformation.html.
31
See, e.g., Aaron Smith & Maeve Duggan, Crossing the Line: What Counts
as Online Harassment?, PEW RES. CTR. 2 (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.pewinternet.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/9/2018/01/PI_2018.01.04_Online-HarassmentScenarios_FINAL.pdf.
32
See, e.g., Mary Anne Franks, Drafting An Effective “Revenge Porn” Law:
A Guide for Legislators (Aug. 17, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2468823;
Andrew Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65
EMORY L.J. 661, 661 (2016).
33
Community
Guidelines,
INSTAGRAM,
INC.,
https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119 (last visited Oct. 15, 2018).
34
Id.
35
Twitter Media Policy, TWITTER, INC., https://help.twitter.com/en/rulesand-policies/media-policy (last visited Oct. 15, 2018). But such content may not
appear in “live video, header, or profile images.” Id.
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a right-wing conspiracy theorist website.36 Twitter noted that Mr.
Jones’ posts had violated the platform’s “Abusive Behavior” policy,
which prohibits “targeted harassment.” 37
Some believe that these policies are applied arbitrarily. For
example, Instagram shut down a photographer’s account after she
posted a photo of a naked model, even though the model’s breasts
were censored with a leaf to avoid violation of the site’s standards.38
Facebook removed the same photo from its platform.39 In a display
of arbitrariness, Instagram deleted a post of a 1992 poem advocating
for LGBT rights because the poem violated community standards,
possibly because it contained words such as “dyke” and “fag.” 40 In
protest, various users reposted the poem; some of the reposts were
removed, but others were not, even though the content was
identical.41 Later, Instagram restored the original post.42 These
incidents demonstrate the challenges platforms face in accurately
and consistently applying content regulations and guidelines. 43
36

See Kate Conger & Jack Nicas, Twitter Bars Alex Jones and Infowars,
Citing
Harassing
Messages,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
6,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/technology/twitter-alex-jonesinfowars.html.
37
Abusive Behavior, TWITTER, INC., https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/abusive-behavior (last visited Oct. 15, 2018); see also Conger & Nicas,
supra note 36.
38
José Da Silva, Instagram Deletes Photographer Dragana Jurisic’s Account
and Facebook Censors Her Work, THE ART NEWSPAPER (May 14, 2018),
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/photographer-dragana-jurisic-hasinstagram-account-closed-down-and-work-censored-on-facebook.
39
Id.
40
Hanna Kozlowska, Why Is Instagram Censoring a 1992 Poem Revered by
the LGBTQ Community?, QUARTZ (Jan 26, 2018), https://qz.com/1190263/whyis-instagram-censoring-zoe-leonards-poem-from-1992/. Instagram only stated the
post “violat[ed] community standards.” Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. Instagram said it was “taken down by mistake.” Id.
43
See also Julia Jacobs, Will Instagram Ever ‘Free the Nipple’?, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/arts/design/instagramfree-the-nipple.html; Tracy Jan & Elizabeth Dwoskin, A White Man Called Her
Kids the N-word. Facebook Stopped Her from Sharing It., WASH. POST (July 31,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/for-facebookerasing-hate-speech-proves-a-daunting-challenge/2017/07/31/922d9bc6-6e3b11e7-9c15-177740635e83_story.html?utm_term=.42ceb51a8c2c.
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Perhaps the most well-known example of a controversial “take
down” was Facebook’s removal of a Pulitzer Prize-winning 1972
photograph of a naked, nine-year-old girl running from a napalm
bombing in the Vietnam War.44 After a massive backlash, Facebook
restored the photo but also maintained that such a photo was
presumed to violate its standards. 45 Yet the photo contained no
sexual connotations and instead represented a newsworthy, tragic,
and historical moment.46
Not all controversial content regulation has been as obvious.
Social media platforms have been accused of political bias resulting
in censorship of certain political viewpoints.47 Lawmakers have
suggested that Facebook has censored conservative voices on the
site,48 and more generally, seventy-two percent of Americans
believe that companies like Facebook and Twitter “actively censor
political views.”49 Facebook kept its guidelines secret for some time,
but recently published its internal Community Guidelines.50 Some
platforms even utilize proprietary algorithms, which in turn has led
to accusations that these algorithms favor certain news organizations
and political viewpoints over others.51 The extent and impact of the
44
Mark Scott & Mike Isaac, Facebook Restores Iconic Vietnam War Photo
It
Censored
for
Nudity,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
9,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/technology/facebook-vietnam-war-photonudity.html.
45
Id. Facebook suggested the photo might “even qualify as child
pornography” in some countries. Id.
46
Id.
47
See, e.g., Joan E. Solsman & Richard Nieva, Twitter ‘Censorship’ Still an
Obsession for Congress as Hearing Gets Political, CNET.COM (Sep. 5, 2018),
https://www.cnet.com/news/twitter-censorship-still-an-obsession-for-congressas-hearing-gets-political/.
48
Id.
49
Riley Griffin, Most Americans Think Facebook and Twitter Censor Their
Political
Views,
BLOOMBERG
(June
28,
2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-28/most-americans-thinksocial-media-giants-censor-their-views.
50
Emma Woollacott, Facebook Reveals Its Secret Rules For Censoring
Posts,
FORBES
(Apr.
24,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2018/04/24/facebook-reveals-itssecret-rules-for-censoring-posts/#49150c2c56da.
51
See Derek Ruths & Jürgen Pfeffer, Social Media for Large Studies of
Behavior, 346 SCIENCE 1063, 1063 (2014); Taibbi, supra note 24; see also

2019]

CENSORSHIP, FREE SPEECH, & FACEBOOK

45

implementation of these algorithms are unclear. 52
Considering how social media platforms have enhanced
communication and provided alternative avenues for important
messages, content policies may threaten and stifle the types of
speech that made these platforms important to begin with. Social
media platforms call themselves “digital public square[s].” 53 But
they impose far more rules than traditional public squares. 54
II. CENSORSHIP, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND STATE ACTION
A. The Right to Censor and the State Action Doctrine
While social media platforms may be subject to criticism and
complaints of bias and arbitrariness in the application of content
regulations, the First Amendment currently provides no recourse.
The First Amendment states that, “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”55 This clause
distinguishes the United States from most other nations due to the
heightened value placed on protecting a wide variety of speech and
expression56 as compared to other values.57 Essentially, “the
Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook is Rating the Trustworthiness of its Users on a
Scale
from
Zero
to
1,
WASH. POST
(Aug.
21,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/21/facebook-is-ratingtrustworthiness-its-users-scale-zero-one/.
52
See Ruths & Pfeffer, supra note 51, at 1063.
53
Kang & Frenkel, supra note 28; see also Community Standards:
Introduction,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/introduction (last visited Oct.
22, 2018).
54
See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983).
55
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
56
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26 (1971) (holding that
wearing a “Fuck the Draft” jacket was not conduct justifying criminal conviction);
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (holding a statute could not prohibit
trademark registration on the basis the mark might be disparaging); Street v. New
York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (“[T]he public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive . . . .”).
57
See FLOYD ABRAMS, THE SOUL OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT xv (2017)
(“The exceptionalism of the United States in the protections it offers . . . does not
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government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 58 As
Justice Harlan so memorably put it, “one man’s vulgarity is
another’s lyric.”59
But the First Amendment’s protections have a substantial limit
because the Constitution generally serves as a check on the
government but not on private entities.60 As a general rule, under the
state action doctrine, the First Amendment applies only when the
“censorship” or invasion on the freedom of speech is an act by the
government.61 Under certain circumstances, a private actor may be
held to be a state actor and therefore subject to constitutional
restrictions.62 But courts have consistently held that online service
providers of various kinds are not state actors, even when First
Amendment issues are at stake.63 For example, courts have held that
AOL is not a state actor subject to the First Amendment. 64 The trend

mean that other democratic nations do not respect, honor, and generally seek to
protect it; it does mean that American law does so more often, more intensely, and
more controversially than is true elsewhere.”).
58
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
59
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25; see also id. at 26 (“[W]e cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial
risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”).
60
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
61
See id.; Bronner v. Duggan, 249 F. Supp. 3d 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2017) (“To
trigger First Amendment protection, the infringement upon speech must have
arisen from state action of some kind.”). State action arises in the context of the
Fourteenth Amendment and applies the First Amendment to the states through the
incorporation doctrine. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 10–11.
62
See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S.
288, 296 (2001) (discussing various doctrines under which a private entity may
be a state actor, such as state control, public function, and sufficient entwinement).
63
See, e.g., Green v. America Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir.
2003); Estavillo v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., No. C-09-03007 RMW, 2009 WL
3072887 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp.
2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003); Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119
F. Supp. 2d 289, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online,
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 445 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
64
See Green, 318 F.3d at 472; Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 546; Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 948 F. Supp. at 445.
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has also extended to a private domain name registrant 65 and to
Sony’s PlayStation 3 Network.66 Most importantly, Facebook is no
exception.67
B. The Public Function Exception to the State Action Doctrine
Of the possible exceptions to state action, the public function
exception is most relevant to social media platforms.68 In Marsh v.
Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a private, company-owned
town was a state actor because the town’s operation was “essentially
a public function.”69 Significant to the Court’s rationale was the
principle that “[t]he more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.”70 The Court even went so far as to assert that in
balancing the rights of property owners with other persons’ First
Amendment rights, “the latter occupy a preferred position.” 71 Thus,
when a facility is “built and operated primarily to benefit the public”
and when its “operation is essentially a public function,” state action
exists.72 Twenty years later in Evans v. Newton the Supreme Court
relied on Marsh and held that a privately-owned park was subject to
state action because of its “public character.” 73
The public function exception has been increasingly narrowed
since Marsh and Evans. In 1968, the Supreme Court held a private

65

See Island Online, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 307.
See Estavillo, 2009 WL 3072887.
67
See Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10–cv–03579–JF/PVT, 2010 WL
4269304, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff’s Section 1983
First Amendment claim).
68
See Jackson, supra note 7, at 142.
69
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505–06 (1946); see also Jackson, supra
note 7, at 143 (noting that Marsh “effectively treated the company-owned town
like a state actor.”).
70
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 507.
71
Id. at 509; see also id. at 506 (“Ownership does not always mean absolute
dominion.”).
72
Id. at 506.
73
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966).
66
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shopping center was a state actor subject to the First Amendment.74
But the Court quickly reversed track and subsequently overruled
itself.75 In 1974, the Supreme Court limited public functions to “the
exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State.”76 This exclusivity requirement was
reaffirmed when the Supreme Court held a private school did not
fall under the public function exception because, while education
was arguably a public function, it was not within “the exclusive
province of the State.”77 The Second Circuit backed away from a
pure exclusivity requirement in 2004, stating the function must have
traditionally been an “exclusive, or near exclusive, function of the
State.”78 But even with a more flexible standard, the court refused
to hold that a library met the exception.79
Not only has the public function exception been narrowed, but
it has also been rejected with respect to online service providers. For
example, in 1996, a federal district court ruled that AOL “exercises
absolutely no powers which are in any way the prerogative, let alone
the exclusive prerogative, of the State.”80 In that case, the plaintiff
argued that AOL, as a provider of email services, performed a public
function because the email services were free, open to the public,
and a place “where public discourse, conversations and commercial
transactions can and do take place.”81 But the district court refused
to analogize AOL to the company town in Marsh, ruling that
providing those services was “not an exercise of any municipal
power or public service that was traditionally exercised by the
74
See Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308, 316–20 (1968).
75
See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 562–64 (1972) (limiting Logan
Valley but declining to overrule it); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976)
(holding that Lloyd Corp. and Logan Valley were incompatible and explicitly
stating that Lloyd Corp. did in fact overrule Logan Valley).
76
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (emphasis added).
77
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (emphasis added).
78
Horvath v. Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2004)
(emphasis added).
79
Id. at 152.
80
Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 441
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
81
Id. at 442.
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State.”82 Although this case is now over twenty years old, the
holding is emblematic of the continuing trend against attributing
state action to online providers.83
The Supreme Court’s most recent discussion of the public
function exception in the First Amendment context focused heavily
on the exclusivity requirement. In Manhattan Community Access
Corp. v. Halleck, the Court held that the operation of public access
cable channels was not a “traditional, exclusive public function.”84
The Court emphasized that “‘very few’ functions fall into” the
public function category.85 It then proceeded to list numerous
functions that do not fit the exception: “running sports associations
and leagues, administering insurance payments, operating nursing
homes, providing special education, representing indigent criminal
defendants, resolving private disputes, and supplying electricity.”86
But in this case, the channels were operated by a private nonprofit. 87
The Court observed that because public access channels have
historically been operated by both public and private entities, such
operation “is not a traditional, exclusive public function within the
meaning of this Court’s cases.”88
But the Court went even further. It rejected the notion that the
“function” at issue was not simply operation of public access cable,
but instead operation of “a public forum for speech.”89 In reasoning
that could be considered somewhat circular, the Court pointed out
that when a private entity provides a forum for speech, it is not
subject to the First Amendment because it is not a state actor. 90 In
fact, the Court asserted, it is a “commonsense principle” that
providing an open forum for speech is not an activity that only
governments have traditionally performed. 91 “In short, merely
82

Id.
See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text.
84
139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
85
Id. at 1929.
86
Id.
87
Id. at 1926.
88
Id. at 1929–30.
89
Id. at 1930.
90
Id.
91
Id.
83
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hosting speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public
function and does not alone transform private entities into state
actors subject to First Amendment constraints.” 92 The Court thus
recognized a constitutional principle that private property owners—
even in the digital space—have editorial discretion within the
bounds of their property.93 Such reasoning seems to foreclose the
possibility of recognizing social media platforms as state actors
under current precedent and the legal landscape. As private entities,
social media platforms fit well within the Court’s description of a
private actor that simply opens up its property for speech. And as
the Court noted, such an act is not enough to find there was state
action to meet the exception.
III. COMMENTARY AND CRITICISM
A. Calls to Embrace Free Speech
Within the realms of law, politics, and society, opinions differ
on the merits and the legal and social implications of social media
content regulation. Moreover, even the starting points for some of
these analyses vary. For instance, some authors have focused on the
possible merits of stemming the tide of fake news and online
harassment on social media.94 In contrast, others have concentrated
on mechanics over merits, looking at how rather than why the First
Amendment can be applied to these private actors. 95
The ACLU has characterized Facebook as having a “nearly
unparalleled status as a forum for political speech and debate,”
arguing that the platform should not remove anything except

92

Id.; see also id. (“As Judge Jacobs persuasively explained, it ‘is not at all a
near-exclusive function of the state to provide the forums for public expression,
politics, information, or entertainment.’” (quoting Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty.
Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2018) (Jacobs, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part))).
93
Id. at 1931.
94
See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 23; Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our
Information Age, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY AND
REPUTATION 31, 38–46 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).
95
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 7, at 121–22;
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“unlawful speech.”96 While acknowledging that a private company
is not “technically bound” by the First Amendment, the organization
has expressed grave concern over Facebook’s ability to moderate
posts or serve as an “arbiter of truth versus misinformation.”97
Notable about the ACLU’s standpoint is its depiction of Facebook
as “a forum for the speech of billions of people.”98 The organization
took it a step further, calling Facebook a “gatekeeper[] of the
modern-day public square,”99 a phrase that harkens back to the
“public function” language in Marsh.100
Benjamin Jackson takes a similar position, arguing that even a
“narrow conception” of the public function exception supports
subjecting sites like Facebook to the First Amendment.101 He
compares social network sites to “public squares and meeting
places” in that both “provid[e] a space that has the primary purpose
of serving as a forum for public communication and expression, that
is designated for that purpose, and that is completely open to the
public at large.”102 Jackson makes an intriguing argument to address
the exclusivity requirement from Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.; he suggests that although large, privately owned spaces have
existed in the past, “they have rarely been dedicated to public speech
or open to virtually all comers.”103 Thus, he argues, a large forum
like Facebook that is dedicated to public speech provides “a service
that was previously ‘exclusively’ provided by the State.”104
B. Apparent Challenges with the Marsh Exception
In 1999, when the internet was a new phenomenon, the Harvard
Law Review dedicated one of its annual Developments in the Law
articles to “what the law of cyberspace could look like in the
96

Eidelman, supra note 7.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. (emphasis added).
100
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
101
Jackson, supra note 7, at 146.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 147.
104
Id. But see infra Section IV.A.
97
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future.”105 The article warns that “[a]bdicating cyberspace to
proprietary interests—and rejecting the existence of public forums
in cyberspace—may pose too great a threat to free speech.” 106 The
article also takes an intriguing position with respect to analogizing
internet entities to the company town in Marsh. Marsh never
actually used the phrase “state action” or “state actor.” 107 Because
Marsh dealt with enforcement of a state trespass law, the Court may
have presumed state action but then “engage[d] in a substantive
balancing of competing rights.”108 Thus, in the opinion of the
Harvard Law Review, Marsh was not even a state action case.109 But
that interpretation of Marsh is inherently and fundamentally flawed
because the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized Marsh as a
state action case.110
Professor Tim Wu of Columbia Law School takes an extremely
negative approach to using the First Amendment to protect free
speech in the social media context, calling the First Amendment “a
bystander in an age of aggressive efforts to propagandize and control
online speech.”111 One of the bases for his claim is the state action
doctrine.112 Wu distinguishes social media platforms from the
company town in Marsh, pointing out that while platforms like
Facebook may serve an important public function, “it seems much
harder to say that they are acting like the government all but in

105

Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1574, 1585 (1999) [hereinafter Developments].
106
Id. at 1603.
107
Id. at 1629 n.120.
108
Id.; see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Sidewalks, Sewers, and State
Action in Cyberspace, THE BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y AT
HARV.
U.,
https://cyber.harvard.edu/is02/readings/stateaction-shaffer-vanhouweling.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2018) (“Strangely, Marsh v. Alabama is
viewed as a classic case in . . . [state action] jurisprudence, although the existence
of state action in Marsh was so clear that Justice Black’s majority opinion does
not even mention the requirement.”).
109
See Developments, supra note 105, at 1628–29, 1629 nn.120–21.
110
See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
111
Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST.
(Sept. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wu-first-amendmentobsolete.
112
Id.
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name.”113 Wu properly warns that if the influence of a platform were
sufficient to extend the public function exception, then the category
would become far too large and undefinable: “If the major speech
platforms . . . ought to be classified as state actors based not on the
assumption of specific state-like duties but merely on their
influence, it is hard to know where the category ends.”114
Wu’s solution to online speech issues is unclear. He suggests the
government could enact laws to address “improper” efforts to
control speech online, all the while acknowledging that such laws
would raise their own First Amendment problems.115 But in a direct
response to Wu’s paper, Geoffrey Stone of the University of
Chicago pushes back.116 He argues that because the Supreme Court
has been willing to play “fast-and-loose” with state action in the
past, it might do so again.117 However, Stone provides little
justification for this assertation, only noting that “profound private
threats to our system of free expression” might incentivize the Court
to take action.118
C. The Right to Access Speech Platforms
Even though the government has appeared at times to shy away
from regulation of the internet and social media platforms, 119 the
Supreme Court recently appeared at least willing to consider the
need for encouraging open access to social media sites.120 In
Packingham v. North Carolina, state action was not the issue since
113

Id.
Id.
115
Id. The implications of state action on social media platforms’ First
Amendment rights is beyond the scope of this Article.
116
Geoffrey R. Stone, Reflections on Whether the First Amendment is
Obsolete,
KNIGHT
FIRST
AMEND.
INST.
(Nov.
1,
2017)
https://knightcolumbia.org/content/reflections-whether-first-amendmentobsolete.
117
See id.
118
Id. (Stone also suggests that Marsh might be a “good jumping off point”
but fails to rebut any of Wu’s criticisms of analogizing social media platforms to
company towns); see also Wu, supra note 111.
119
See, e.g., infra notes 134–43 and accompanying text.
120
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735–37 (2017).
114
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the Court was tasked with considering the constitutionality of a
North Carolina statute preventing registered sex offenders from
accessing social networking websites.121 But in the majority
opinion, Justice Kennedy made bold statements regarding the
importance of the internet in general. He affirmed that “social media
in particular” is one of “the most important places (in a spatial sense)
for the exchange of views.”122 Justice Kennedy described one of the
First Amendment’s “fundamental principle[s]” as being that “all
persons have access to places where they can speak and listen.”123
Most notable about this statement is the Court’s apparent extension
of the First Amendment right to speak to the right to have access to
places to speak. Justice Kennedy later warned that “the Court must
exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the First
Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in
that medium.”124 Statements like these signal that the Court may be
seeking ways to promote freedom of speech on the internet. 125
Similarly, in 1994, the Supreme Court considered a First
Amendment challenge by cable companies to a statute requiring
them to transmit local broadcast stations. 126 Although the Court
remanded the case for further consideration, the Court was
concerned about the “potential for abuse of this private power over

121

Id. at 1734.
Id. at 1735; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (referring
to the internet as “vast democratic forums”).
123
Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735 (emphasis added).
124
Id. at 1736.
125
Since Justice Kennedy has retired, it is left to be seen whether other
justices will be willing to continue this ideology. See Michael D. Shear, Supreme
Court Justice Anthony Kennedy Will Retire, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/politics/anthony-kennedy-retiresupreme-court.html. Notably, Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, once argued that net neutrality regulations violate the First
Amendment rights of online service providers because they restrict providers’
editorial discretion. See United States Telecom Assoc. v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381,
417–18 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also supra note 115 and
accompanying text. So far on the Supreme Court bench, Justice Kavanaugh has
already authored one opinion rejecting the public function exception. See supra
notes 84–93 and accompanying text.
126
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 626 (1994).
122
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a central avenue of communication.”127 The Court noted there is
value in “ensur[ing] that private interests not restrict, through
physical control of a critical pathway of communication, the free
flow of information and ideas.”128 Again, state action was not at
issue, but this case demonstrates the Court’s concern that the public
have unimpeded access to information, even when the platform is
maintained by a private entity. Also, the Court did not immediately
strike the statute as violative of the First Amendment even though
the statute directly affected cable companies’ discretion as to what
content they provided.129 Thus, this position, along with the position
in Packingham,130 suggests that the Supreme Court might be willing
to treat social media platforms as a public function. Using phrases
like “critical pathway of communication”131 and “most important
places . . . for the exchange of views” 132 is a good start.133
D. Policy Considerations
Congress has demonstrated reluctance to attribute liability to
online platforms in other legal spheres. The most prevalent example
is 47 U.S.C. § 230, which immunizes websites from liability for
third-party content.134 In doing so, Congress recognized that “[t]he
Internet . . . offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity,” and that the internet has
127

Id. at 657.
Id.
129
Id. at 668.
130
See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text.
131
Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 657.
132
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017).
133
See also Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1611 (2018)
(suggesting that Packingham “might breathe new life into the application of state
action doctrine to internet platforms”). But see supra notes 84–93 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court’s latest discussion on the public function
exception—and rejection of the doctrine for public cable access—in Manhattan
Community Access Corp. v. Halleck).
134
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); see also Eric Goldman, The Ten Most
Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 1–2 (2017).
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“flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.”135 Section 230 has been characterized as
providing “the legal foundation for the Internet we know and love
the most.”136 Among other things, the statute protects websites from
being liable for moderating third-party content, including a
website’s decision on what content to publish, edit, or remove. 137 In
fact, Section 230 may even serve to reduce website censorship, since
websites can be less concerned with liability for what they do or do
not permit.138
Social media platforms are covered by Section 230’s
immunity.139 In other words, Section 230 appears to protect social
media platforms from many legal claims and causes of action that
the First Amendment (through state action) would otherwise hold
them responsible for.140 The statute serves to protect social media
platforms’ editorial discretion.141 Of course, if state action was
135

47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)–(4).
Goldman, supra note 134, at 2.
137
47 U.S.C. § 230(c); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
332–33 (1997); Goldman, supra note 134, at 3.
138
See Note, Section 230 As First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2027,
2027 (2018) (“This intermediary liability protection encourages websites to
engage in content moderation without fear that their efforts to screen content will
expose them to liability for defamatory material that slips through. Without this
protection, websites would have an incentive to censor constitutionally protected
speech in order to avoid potential lawsuits.”).
139
Section 230’s immunity only extends if the service provider is not also
functioning as an “information content provider” (ICP). Fair Hous. Council of San
Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
An ICP is a provider “responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). When platforms
regulate user-generated content, they are likely protected by Section 230. See
Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162–64 (distinguishing between displaying thirdparty content and actually contributing to content creation); see also Klayman v.
Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357–60 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding Facebook
immunized by Section 230); Perkins v. Linkedin Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1222,
1246–49 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding LinkedIn not protected by Section 230 as to
its generation of emails).
140
Section 230 often arises with tort liability, but “creates . . . immunity to
any cause of action.” Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also Roomates.com, 521 F.3d at
1164 (considering Section 230 immunity in the context of a civil rights claim).
141
See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
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attributed to social media platforms, the First Amendment’s
protections would trump any statute, including Section 230.142
Nevertheless, Section 230’s history represents an important policy
consideration, namely that the internet has thrived because of the
immunity and discretion granted to websites.143 Section 230 has
demonstrated the benefits derived from protecting online providers,
rather than opening them to liability.
Professor Richard Epstein has cautioned against stretching
existing legal principles to fit the internet.144 Although
acknowledging that some principles “may need a bit of tweaking,”
he posits that if they were sound at their inception, then they should
suffice now.145 The internet may create tension between property
rights and the First Amendment, but Epstein argues this is nothing
new compared to traditional tensions.146 “There is less novelty here
than meets the eye.”147 Just because a technology involves the
“control and dissemination of information” does not mean the First
Amendment must play a role, since the First Amendment does not
necessarily trump property rights.148 But Epstein’s view may not be
entirely accurate. In 1969, the Supreme Court suggested that “[i]t is
142

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Section 230 was recently amended to exclude from immunity websites
engaged in certain acts related to sex trafficking. See Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, 132 Stat. 1253 (2017) (codified in part
at 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)). The amendment is the subject of substantial controversy,
including a constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Woodhull Freedom Found. v.
United States, 334 F. Supp. 3d 185 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-5298
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 12, 2018); Eric Goldman, Sex Trafficking Exceptions to Section
230 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Papers Series, No.
2017-13, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3038632; Emily Stewart, The Next Big
Battle Over Internet Freedom Is Here, VOX (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/23/17237640/fosta-sestasection-230-internet-freedom.
144
See Richard Epstein, The Irrelevance of the First Amendment to the
Modern Regulation of the Internet, 23 COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR
COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 100, 100 (2014).
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Id. at 111; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996).
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Epstein, supra note 144, at 102.
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Id. at 111.
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the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas . . . rather than to countenance monopolization
of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private
licensee.”149 If the Court formerly entertained the notion of the First
Amendment trumping other private property rights, it might do so
again.150
Another caveat comes from Peter Suderman, who warns against
placing too much value in social media.151 While acknowledging
that it is unsurprising that the rise of social media has been followed
by calls for regulation of the content on those platforms, he asserts
that regulation would damage how people view speech itself. 152 In
Suderman’s view, embracing regulation is, at its core, “a view that
speech . . . is not an individual right, but a collective good that
should be subject to political control.” 153 Thus, it is more important
for citizens to take responsibility for their own social media
consumption rather than impose regulations on others. 154 Suderman
specifically argues against government involvement in regulation
but also appears opposed to forcing platforms to be completely open
and unregulated.155 Suderman’s solution is to keep the government
149
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (emphasis added).
While the Court was specifically addressing the fairness doctrine here, the Court’s
willingness to make this statement is noteworthy. See id. (“It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”).
The FCC subsequently withdrew the fairness doctrine based on its own position
the doctrine was unconstitutional. See In re Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd.
5043, 5057–58 (1987); see also Thomas W. Hazlett et al., The Overly Active
Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 51 (2010) (calling Red
Lion “fatally flawed.”).
150
See supra notes 70–72, 119–29 and accompanying text.
151
Suderman, supra note 25; see also infra notes 200–04 and accompanying
text; cf. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1015–16 (2010) (arguing that while the
internet may require new rules in certain contexts, “the role of the Constitution
should remain constant regardless of technology.”); Joseph H. Sommer, Against
Cyberlaw, 15 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1149 (2000) (“To risk a metaphor from
another technology, the Internet can be an excellent lens for seeing other things.
It is not, however, a particularly useful focal plane of legal analysis.”).
152
See Suderman, supra note 25.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id. (“Social media corporations, as private entities, have the right to ban
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out of regulation of platforms entirely and to simply allow them to
regulate themselves.156
Professor Ari Ezra Waldman provided a thought-provoking
defense of social media platforms’ content regulation in a written
statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
the Judiciary.157 Waldman compared social media platforms to
traditional media platforms, which have editorial discretion to
control what is published.158 According to Waldman, content
regulations provide structure; without regulations, “[i]t would just
be spectacle, and really bad, cacophonous, headache-inducing
spectacle at that.”159 Even though internal content regulation may be
imperfect, Waldman argued, it is better than nothing. 160 Waldman
also defended the systems employed to regulate content, stating that
the “top level moderation happens back at headquarters, by lawyers
directly responsible for content moderation policies and training.”161
His implication seems to be that since these moderators “are trained
to exercise judgment based on rules set out by the platforms,” users
should just trust them.162 Without citing any specific authority, he
also asserted that the policies “reflect . . . free speech norms.” 163
Ultimately, though, Waldman’s overall attitude toward social
media platforms is somewhat unclear, given that he proceeded to
anyone, for any or no reason.”).
156
See id.
157
Filtering Practices of Social Media Platforms: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (written statement of Ari Ezra
Waldman,
Professor
of
Law,
New
York
Law
School),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20180426/108231/HHRG-115-JU00Wstate-WaldmanA-20180426.pdf [hereinafter Filtering Practices].
158
See id. at 3–4 (“Neither Salon nor the National Review can publish
everything.”).
159
Id. at 4; see also Emma Grey Ellis & Louise Matsakis, Diamond and Silk
Expose Facebook’s Burden of Moderation, WIRED (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/diamond-and-silk-expose-facebooks-burden-ofmoderation/ (pointing out that “to communicate anything, Facebook can’t
communicate everything.”).
160
See Filtering Practices, supra note 157, at 5.
161
Id. at 4.
162
Id.
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Id.

60

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 15:1

transition into criticism of Facebook’s privacy policies and data
protection.164 Irrespective of Waldman’s “just trust them” view as
to content regulation, he makes a valid point with respect to the role
Facebook plays in society: “[W]e don’t have a First Amendment
right to Facebook’s amplification of our words.”165 But even this
assertion is called into question in light of Justice Kennedy’s
discussion on how access to places to speak is part of the First
Amendment’s protections.166 If First Amendment rights include
access to opportunities to speak, and if social media platforms are
so powerful in amplifying our speech, then perhaps a person should
have the right to access and speak on social media.
IV. WEIGHING THE MERITS OF FINDING STATE ACTION
This Part will explore the chances and merits of finding that
social media platforms are state actors under the public function
exception. As will be discussed, courts should not find that these
platforms fit the public function exception, both as a matter of law
and as a matter of policy. This Part will first consider the problems
with attributing state action to social media platforms, and then will
explore alternative regulation methods.
A. The Public Function Exception
As an initial matter, social media platforms may bear some
resemblance to the company town in Marsh v. Alabama. Social
media platforms open up their service for public use, just like the
company town in Marsh opened up its private property for public
use.167 But the challenge is identifying the specific public function
164

Id. at 6–7 (“[A]lthough the evidence isn’t there to suggest a systemic bias
when it comes to content moderation, there is evidence that Facebook . . . cares
very little about . . . our data.”).
165
Id. at 4.
166
See supra notes 119–25 and accompanying text.
167
See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507 (1946) (Whether a website, existing
purely on the internet, can be fairly analogized to a physical space, like a town, is
another intriguing issue beyond the scope of this Article). See generally Dan
Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 439 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CALIF.
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that social media platforms serve. Benjamin Jackson accurately
notes that social media platforms serve a function of providing a
forum for communication and expression.168 But that function is not
uniquely public.169 Outside the online realm, various entities provide
large venues for the exchange of information, such as newspapers
and libraries.170 Those entities can be private or public, and the
private entities are not state actors.171 Thus, there is no tradition that
venues for communication and expression are operated by the State.
The analogy is further weakened because, even though some such
venues may be public, many of those venues have been traditionally
private.172 Therefore, this is not an area where the function has been
an “exclusive, or near exclusive,”173 state function. Moreover, even
though a social media platform may have a governing body for its
users, that fact alone is insufficient to attribute state action to the
platform.174
L. REV. 521 (2003).
168
Jackson, supra note 7, at 146; see also supra notes 15–21 and
accompanying text (discussing the definition of the term “social media”).
169
See, e.g., supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
170
See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1930
(2019) (“After all, private property owners and private lessees often open their
property for speech. Grocery stores put up community bulletin boards. Comedy
clubs host open mic nights.”).
171
See, e.g., Assocs. & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 134–
36 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a newspaper was not a state actor); Horvath v.
Westport Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that a library
does not perform a public function).
172
For example, Benjamin Franklin “provided library services to the citizens
of Philadelphia two hundred and fifty years ago.” Horvath, 362 F.3d at 152.
Private libraries still exist, like those in universities. See, e.g., Professional Center
Library: About, WAKE FOREST U., http://library.law.wfu.edu/about/ (last visited
Oct. 26, 2018) (noting that “[t]he Wake Forest University Professional Center
Library is a private academic library.”). Newspapers are also not state-run. See,
e.g., Paul Farhi, Washington Post to be Sold to Jeff Bezos, the Founder of Amazon,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
6,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/washington-post-to-be-sold-to-jeffbezos/2013/08/05/ca537c9e-fe0c-11e2-9711-3708310f6f4d_story.html.
173
Horvath, 362 F.3d at 151.
174
For a discussion of the most recent iteration of the Court’s articulation of
this principle, see supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text. See also Orin S.
Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 395 (2003)
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B. Negative Consequences
Even if the public function exception could be extended to social
media platforms, the broader, more fundamental question is whether
it should be extended. Such an extension would be inappropriate as
a matter of policy. Further, such an extension would be an
inappropriate legal doctrine.175
1. A Free For All on Social Media
At first glance, the consequences of finding social media
platforms to be state actors are extremely appealing. With the state
action requirement satisfied, social media users could invoke their
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, thus preserving the
“uninhibited marketplace of ideas.” 176 In fact, a prospective plaintiff
would have two methods for asserting those First Amendment
rights: both (1) a claim for equitable relief under the Fourteenth
Amendment,177 and (2) a claim for civil relief under Section 1983.178
(“While Marsh remains good law, the Supreme Court generally has rejected the
Marsh approach when a private entity ‘seemed’ like the government only to
specific individuals encountering the entity in the context of a specific
relationship.”).
175
One tremendous consequence of treating social media platforms as state
actors is that state action is not just a First Amendment doctrine. For example, if
an entity is a state actor, then it is subject to not only the First Amendment but
also the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole. See supra note 61. Because this
Article is focusing solely on First Amendment issues, the plethora of
consequences outside of the First Amendment context are beyond the scope of
this Article. Nonetheless, those consequences would be far-reaching and deserve
extensive consideration.
176
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting FCC v.
League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)).
177
See supra note 61; Julie K. Brown, Less is More: Decluttering the State
Action Doctrine, 73 MO. L. REV. 561, 564 (2008).
178
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (“Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress . . . .”); Brown, supra note 177, at 564. Although Section 1983, instead
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Of course, not all speech or expression would be permissible.
Even where the First Amendment applies, certain forms of speech
may be prohibited.179 Consequently, social media sites could likely
still prohibit traditionally unprotected speech, including language
that incites illegal action,180 fighting words,181 obscenity,182 child
pornography,183 and some forms of defamation.184 But negative
consequences would follow. For example, Twitter would no longer
be able to allow users to block other users, since that action would
constitute an infringement on the blocked user’s ability to speak and
have access to portions of the platform.185 Another example is hate
speech. Hate speech is protected under the First Amendment.186
Thus, ironically, platforms would be required to keep up much of
the objectionable content (such as hate speech) that many have
of requiring state action, requires the defendant to have acted under color of state
law, the presence of state action satisfies the color of law requirement. See Lugar
v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982) (“If the challenged
conduct . . . constitutes state action . . . then that conduct was also action under
color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983.”).
179
See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (quoting R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S., 377, 382–83 (1992)) (noting that “the First
Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few
limited areas,’ and has never ‘include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional
limitations.’”).
180
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
181
See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
182
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
183
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
184
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345–46 (1974).
185
A similar situation has already occurred, when President Donald Trump
was prohibited from blocking Twitter followers who expressed views he
disagreed with, because such blocking violated the First Amendment rights of the
blocked users. See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump,
928 F.3d 226, 230 (2d Cir. 2019). Notably the court explicitly avoided considering
“whether private social media companies are bound by the First Amendment
when policing their platforms.” Id.
186
See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1764 (2017) (“Speech that demeans
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar
ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that
we protect the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’” (quoting United
States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
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called for platforms to exercise more control over.
Applying First Amendment protections would also raise new,
complex questions about content regulation even within unprotected
forms of speech. Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, the
government cannot regulate a subcategory of speech according to
different rules than those that apply to the larger category. 187 For
example, even though Facebook could prohibit fighting words, 188 it
would not be permitted to regulate some fighting words but allow
others. Granting social media users the protections of the First
Amendment would effectively tie the hands of social media
platforms, inhibiting them from acting in an editorial function to
engage in meaningful or helpful content curation or control. 189
2. Maintaining the Public/Private Distinction
A further challenge to attributing state action to social media
platforms is its interference with the line the Supreme Court has
drawn, for better or for worse, between public and private actors. 190
This line is rooted in a respect for private autonomy and the proper
187

See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
See supra notes 180–85 and accompanying text.
189
Editorial discretion is a central privilege to any private entity that opens
up its forum to the public. See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.
Ct. 1921, 1930–31 (2019) (“If the rule were otherwise, all private property owners
and private lessees who open their property for speech would be subject to First
Amendment constraints and would lose the ability to exercise what they deem to
be appropriate editorial discretion within that open forum.”). Newspapers’
editorial function has long been recognized as an important and protected
privilege. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 570 (1995); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 258 (1974); N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 265–66; supra notes 134–43
(discussing Section 230’s protection of online providers’ editorial privilege).
190
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged this line is not clear or
consistent. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991)
(“Unfortunately, our cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of
the state have not been a model of consistency.”). But the Court has insisted that
the line does exist. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (“Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject
to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable)
that is not.”).
188
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role of the judiciary.191 The public/private distinction recognizes
that there are “some areas of life . . . where individual and
associational decision-making must remain largely free from
governmental control.”192 This distinction developed out of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and is more or less assumed,
even taken for granted, in modern society. 193
While social media sites may be analogized to company towns,
the two are fairly distinguishable.194 At its core, Facebook is a
private website operated for commercial profit purposes. It may
serve the public but so does a restaurant. Yet a restaurant is only
subject to certain restrictions because Congress took legislative
action.195 Absent such legislation, which is in the purview of
Congress’ authority,196 constitutional restrictions should not be
forced on social media platforms by stretching an already confusing
and convoluted doctrine.197 While perhaps the public/private
191

See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295 (alteration in original) (quoting
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (2001)) (noting
there is a “judicial obligation” to “preserv[e] an area of individual freedom by
limiting the reach of federal law”); Gerald Turkel, The Public/Private Distinction:
Approaches to the Critique of Legal Ideology, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 801, 801
(1988) (“The dichotomy appears necessary for individual autonomy, the
maintenance of social institutions, and the conduct of legal action . . . .”).
192
James M. Oleske, Jr., Doric Columns Are Not Falling: Wedding Cakes,
the Ministerial Exception, and the Public-Private Distinction, 75 MD. L. REV.
142, 145 (2015).
193
See Morton J. Horwitzt, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (1982); Oleske, supra note 192, at 144.
194
See supra Section IV.A.
195
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits certain discriminatory acts by
“places of public accommodation,” including restaurants. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a),
(b)(2) (2012).
196
See Jackson, supra note 7, at 159 (“[A]s most social network websites are
for-profit businesses that serve customers across state lines, it seems that Congress
would have adequate Commerce Clause power to regulate at least some of the
activities of social network websites.”); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights,
89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 94 (2009) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of
Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)) (“[T]he Commerce Clause
‘no doubt’ allow[s] Congress to proscribe private efforts to prevent the exercise
of speech or rights secured only against state interference . . . .”).
197
See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,” Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967)
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distinction is actually a fiction or unwarranted as a matter of
policy,198 there must be a better reason to remove this distinction
than the simple fact that an entity exists online. As discussed in the
next subsection, the internet need not and should not change all of
the rules.
3. Internet Exceptionalism
Attributing state action to social media platforms elevates the
internet to a position it should not hold, an act scholars have coined
as “internet exceptionalism.”199 Fundamentally, social media
platforms are forums for communication and expression, just like
newspapers, libraries, and many other “offline” entities.200 Yet these
offline equivalents are not state actors.201 While the internet has
created many unique questions, the rules for a platform or entity
should not change simply because it exists online. When an online
platform serves the same purpose as an offline platform, the same
rules should apply.
The advent of the internet and social media is not the first time
new technology has raised new questions. In this respect, the
internet is not unique. Since the dawn of time, mankind has
developed new technologies. With each new technology comes new
questions. Yet they are but variations on a familiar theme. Unless
the fundamental function changes, the mere novelty of the
technology ought not merit changes in the law. New technology
(calling the state action doctrine a “conceptual disaster area”); sources cited supra
note 190.
198
See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, Public-Private Penumbra–Fourteen Years
Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (1982); Hila Shamir, The Public/Private
Distinction Now: The Challenges of Privatization and of the Regulatory State, 15
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 2 (2014) (citing numerous sources critiquing and
supporting the distinction).
199
See, e.g., Tim Wu, Is Internet Exceptionalism Dead?, in THE NEXT
DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 179, 179–80 (Berin
Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2011); Eric Goldman, The Third Wave of Internet
Exceptionalism, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Mar. 11, 2009),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2009/03/the_third_wave.htm.
200
See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text.
201
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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alone should not dictate changes in the law.202 The law should be
developed and applied independent of the medium.203 Courts should
not abolish the public/private distinction online unless they are
willing to do so offline. Furthermore, courts should not expand the
definition of state action in the online sphere where it has not done
so offline. Social media platforms, newspapers, and book clubs all
serve the fundamental purpose of facilitating communication and
expression. Unless courts are willing to extend state action to
newspapers and book clubs, they should not extend state action to
social media platforms.204
C. Alternative Regulation Methods
Professor Lawrence Lessig of Harvard Law School has
articulated four “modalities of regulation”—four ways in which
behavior can be shaped and controlled. 205 These four modalities are
202

See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 208 (1996); Sommer, supra note
151, at 1148 (“Law is a conservative practice, drawing heavily on analogy and
history. Of course, legal doctrines will change; they always do. The new
information technologies will trigger some of these changes. But with a few
exceptions, these changes will exist only in the details.”).
203
See Easterbrook, supra note 145, at 208. Contra Orin S. Kerr, Foreword:
Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 403
(2013) (“A law created for one world may have a very different impact when
applied to the facts of a different era. As a result, changing technology and social
practice often trigger a need for legal adaptation.”).
204
Actually, not applying the First Amendment to social media platforms
might in fact help platforms address current issues like Russian interference and
targeted bots, since platforms would not have to be concerned about “censoring”
those voices and could invoke their editorial privilege. See Miami Herald Publ’g
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (discussing the important of a
newspaper’s editorial privilege). Just as the New York Times can refuse to publish
an advertisement it suspects was sponsored by Russia attempting to improperly
influence a U.S. election, so too could Facebook regulate its ads to thwart Russian
bots. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Facebook Removes More Accounts Tied to Russian
‘Troll
Factory’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/03/business/facebook-russian-trollsremoved.html.
205
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1999).
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law, social norms, markets, and architecture.206 The law is merely
one way to control objectionable behavior. Thus, while social media
platform’s content regulation may be harmful and concerning, the
First Amendment is not the only potential or viable solution.
In addition to regulation by law, Lessig notes that social norms
are enforced by the community, and the markets regulate by price.207
Both of these modalities can be and have been used to remedy
objectionable content regulation online. Social media platforms
have come under extreme scrutiny for their content regulation
practices.208 Moreover, the scrutiny and pressure has originated both
from Congress and private entities.209 As a result of that scrutiny,
platforms have begun to acknowledge the unique role they play in
modern society and the need to take responsibility for improving
how they handle these challenges. 210
For example, Facebook has already taken steps in response to
criticism of its takedown procedures. In April 2018, the website
published its formerly secret, internal community guidelines for
public access.211 These guidelines are quite detailed.212 While they
may not be perfect, they add a new level of transparency.
Additionally, Facebook has instituted an appeals process, giving
users the opportunity to explain their content and provide more
206

Id.
Id.
208
See, e.g., 2017 Was a Year of Scrutiny for Social Media and Other Tech,
PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/2017was-a-year-of-scrutiny-for-social-media-and-other-tech.
209
See, e.g., supra note 208 and accompanying text; Tom Hudson, Social
Media, Search Under Scrutiny on Wall Street and Capitol Hill, MIAMI HERALD
(Aug.
31,
2018),
https://www.miamiherald.com/latestnews/article217602880.html; Social Media Firms Under Scrutiny for 'Russian
Meddling’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-41821359.
210
See, e.g., Twitter: Transparency and Accountability: Hearing Before the
H. Comm on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. (Sept. 5, 2018) (written statement
of
Jack
Dorsey,
Chief
Executive
Officer,
Twitter,
Inc.),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180905/108642/HHRG-115-IF00Wstate-DorseyJ-20180905.pdf [hereinafter Twitter: Transparency and
Accountability].
211
See Woollacott, supra note 50.
212
See Community Standards: Introduction, supra note 53.
207
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context if they think their content does not violate the guidelines. 213
Recent policy changes at YouTube (although arguably not a social
media platform within the definition of this Article214) serve as
another example of how platforms are becoming more responsive.
In June 2019, YouTube announced that it would increase its efforts
to remove “hateful content” such as videos that deny historical
events or that advocate group discrimination.215 Content targeted by
the new policy would include videos promoting Nazi ideology,
denying the Holocaust, or denying the shooting at Sandy Hook
Elementary School.216 These types of changes exemplify how
platforms are regulated by social norms and pressure.
Furthermore, market forces are becoming more influential
regulators. For example, consumers have begun calling for brands
to put pressure on social media platforms to better handle data, fake
news, and offensive content.217 As brands begin to recognize how
consumers link their brand to social media platforms, those brands
may begin to exert economic influence over social media platforms
by threatening to pull advertisements if the platforms do not begin
to more effectively address these important issues. Because most
social media platforms rely heavily on advertisement revenue,
consumers and advertisers have a direct leveraging tool to
encourage, or even force, platforms to make policy changes. 218
213

See Woollacott, supra note 50. Instagram, which is owned by Facebook,
also implemented a similar structure. See Changes to Our Account Disable Policy,
INSTAGRAM
(July
18,
2019),
https://instagrampress.com/blog/2019/07/18/changes-to-our-account-disable-policy/.
214
See supra note 18–21 and accompanying text.
215
See Georgia Wells, YouTube Bans Hateful Videos From Platform, WALL
STREET J. (June 5, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/youtube-banssupremacist-videos-11559754035?mod=djemwhatsnews.
216
See id.
217
See Trust Barometer Special Report: Brands and Social Media, EDELMAN
(June 18, 2018), https://www.edelman.com/research/trust-barometer-brandssocial-media.
218
See, e.g., Wells, supra note 215 (“YouTube also has to factor in the
concerns of advertisers, who covet the huge and devoted audience that the
platform brings but don’t want their brands to be associated with hate or
extremism. . . . [N]ew ads on YouTube videos are critical to the conglomerate’s
[Google’s] future.”).
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The stock market itself has also reflected the pressure placed on
social media platforms. During Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey’s
testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on possible
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Twitter’s stock
dropped six percent.219 In contrast, Facebook’s stock rose nearly
four and a half percent when Mark Zuckerberg confidently testified
before Congress, admitting that Facebook had made mistakes in the
past and describing practical steps the company was taking to
remedy various issues.220 Profit-driven social media platforms
cannot ignore stock market trends and how the market reacts directly
to platforms’ action or inaction.221
Since social media platforms depend on users to maintain
relevance, platforms will respond to criticism and outcry. The power
of users to influence platforms should not be underestimated. Money
is a motivator. Platforms will not and cannot discount the financial
repercussions of ignoring the social and market influences currently
at play.222
In the legal realm, the First Amendment is not the only available
219
Amelia Lucas, Twitter Shares Fall 6% as CEO Jack Dorsey Testifies
Before Senate, CNBC (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/05/twittershares-drop-6percent-during-dorseys-senate-testimony.html.
220
See Mark Zuckerberg Testimony: Senators Question Facebook’s
Commitment
to
Privacy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
10,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/us/politics/mark-zuckerbergtestimony.html.
221
Stock market performance can also be linked to the advertising issues
discussed above. See also Wells, supra note 215 (discussing how, after an
earnings call at Alphabet Inc. (Google’s parent company) where advertisement
growth was reported to be decelerating, “Alphabet’s stock took its biggest dive in
nearly seven years.”).
222
See Emily Stewart, The $120-Billion Reason We Can’t Expect Facebook
to Police Itself, VOX (July 28, 2018), https://www.vox.com/business-andfinance/2018/7/28/17625218/facebook-stock-price-twitter-earnings. While Ms.
Stewart argues that Facebook and Twitter cannot be trusted to regulate
themselves, her analysis demonstrates how market forces affect platforms’
decisions. Ms. Stewart accurately notes that “big money can speak pretty loud”
and that platforms will make profit-motivated decisions. Id. Her observation is the
very reason why platforms are likely to improve their policies: because stock
prices reflect consumer confidence, and because consumers place pressure on
brands (in turn pressuring the platforms), platforms will recognize the financial
repercussions and react accordingly.
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form of regulation. For example, existing state contract law might
be invoked if a social media platform fails to properly apply its own
content guidelines.223 Since users agree to abide by Instagram’s
Community Guidelines when they agree to the service’s Terms of
Use,224 Instagram’s failure to properly abide by its own Community
Guidelines could be considered a breach of the Terms of Use by
Instagram. The legal foundation of such a claim is unclear at best
since some courts have ruled that Facebook’s Terms of Service do
not create affirmative obligations for Facebook. 225 In fact, Facebook
has used its own Terms of Service to successfully defend against a
breach of contract claim.226 But with platforms beginning to publicly
acknowledge their duty to consumers and rework their internal
regulation policies,227 it is possible that those policies and terms of
service could be interpreted to confer contractual obligations on the
platform and not just the user.
A more tenable legal enforcement option is consumer protection
law. Agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) have
rules in place that govern improper practices by social media
platforms.228 Moreover, the Justice Department has already begun
talks to explore consumer protection in the context of social media
platforms.229 The FTC has brought enforcement actions against
223

See James L. Gattuso, The Downside of Regulating Facebook, FOUND.
ECON. EDUC. (May 06, 2018), https://fee.org/articles/the-downside-ofregulating-facebook/.
224
See
Terms
of
Use,
INSTAGRAM,
INC.,
https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870?helpref=faq_content (last visited
Oct. 26, 2018).
225
See, e.g., Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1064 (N.D.
Cal. 2016); Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10–cv–03579, 2010 WL 4269304, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010).
226
See Caraccioli, 167 F. Supp. 3d at 1063–64.
227
See, e.g., Twitter: Transparency and Accountability, supra note 210, at 1
(“We are committed to hold ourselves publicly accountable towards progress of
our health initiative.”).
228
See Gattuso, supra note 223. Under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012), the FTC
can prevent entities from “using unfair methods of competition . . . and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices.”
229
See U.S. Justice Department to Discuss Consumer Protection at Social
Media Meeting, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-justice-tech/u-s-justice-dept-to-discuss-consumer-protection-at-socialFOR
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various social media platforms, including Twitter, Snapchat, and the
now-defunct Google Buzz.230 In 2019, the FTC fined Facebook
approximately $5 billion for mishandling users’ personal
information—the largest fine the federal government has ever levied
against a technology company.231 Most recently, many large
technology companies have come under considerable scrutiny in the
antitrust context. Facebook is facing an antitrust probe by the
FTC.232 Moreover, several state Attorneys General have announced
their own antitrust investigation into both Facebook and Google. 233
Although the FTC’s focus in the technology sphere has been on data
privacy and security,234 the agency could also focus its efforts on
fairness in content regulation.235 The Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) is another viable candidate for the task.236
Although the FCC is currently only authorized to regulate
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite, and cable, it is
a fundamental authority for communication and technology
regulation.237 Regulating social media platforms could very well
media-meeting-idUSKCN1M42Q9?il=0 [hereinafter Social Media Meeting].
230
See, e.g., Julie Brill, Privacy & Consumer Protection in Social Media, 90
N.C. L. REV. 1295, 1298–99 (2012); Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That
Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (May
8, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchatsettles-ftc-charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were.
231
See Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/facebook-ftcfine.html?module=inline.
232
See Barbara Ortutay, Under Pressure: Facebook Faces Antitrust Probes,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Sept.
6,
2019),
https://apnews.com/be13c1c442f9474c82194ca86aa327a9.
233
See id.; 48 U.S. States Launch Antitrust Investigation into Google, CBS
NEWS (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-antitrust-probe48-u-s-states-launch-antitrust-investigation-of-google-dominance-in-search-adsand-data/.
234
See, e.g., Social Media Meeting, supra note 229; Brill, supra note 230, at
1296–97.
235
See Brill, supra note 230, at 1299 (“Consumers have certain expectations
based on what they are told will be done with their information, and social
networks must honor the promises they make to consumers.”).
236
See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
237
What We Do, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do (last
visited Nov. 7, 2019).
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come within the purview of this agency. Its expertise on
communication and technology would make it well suited for the
task.
CONCLUSION
While the First Amendment, coupled with the public function
exception, is an appealing remedy to social media censorship, the
legal and policy costs outweigh the benefits of extending the
doctrine. The legal and policy foundations for extending the
exception are weak and would require an unnecessary degree of
internet exceptionalism as justification. Alternative regulation
methods—like consumer and brand pressure, market forces, and
Congressional and executive agency action—can adequately
resolve many of these challenges. Social media and the internet may
raise questions, but the questions are not new, and the answers need
not be radical.

